Anderson v. Mandalay Corp., Nev. Adv. Op. 82 (Oct. 10, 2015) by Haws, Emily
Scholarly Commons @ UNLV Law
Nevada Supreme Court Summaries Law Journals
10-10-2015
Anderson v. Mandalay Corp., Nev. Adv. Op. 82
(Oct. 10, 2015)
Emily Haws
Nevada Law Journal
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholars.law.unlv.edu/nvscs
Part of the Torts Commons
This Case Summary is brought to you by Scholarly Commons @ UNLV Law, an institutional repository administered by the Wiener-Rogers Law
Library at the William S. Boyd School of Law. For more information, please contact david.mcclure@unlv.edu.
Recommended Citation
Haws, Emily, "Anderson v. Mandalay Corp., Nev. Adv. Op. 82 (Oct. 10, 2015)" (2015). Nevada Supreme Court Summaries. Paper 911.
http://scholars.law.unlv.edu/nvscs/911
1 
 
Anderson v. Mandalay Corp., Nev. Adv. Op. 82 (Oct. 10, 2015)1 
 
TORTS: VICARIOUS LIABILITY 
 
Summary 
 
 The Court determined (1) NRS § 41.745(1)(c) sets forth a factual inquiry; (2) a 
reasonable jury could find it “reasonably foreseeable under the facts and circumstances of the 
case considering the nature and scope of his . . . employment” that a hotel employee would rape 
a hotel guest; and (3) direct negligence claims against an employer are not futile when a 
reasonable jury could conclude under the facts that the employer could reasonably foresee the 
employee’s unlawful act. 
 
Background  
 
 On September 8, 2008, Cristie Anderson came to Las Vegas to attend a trade show. After 
completing her work-related duties, Anderson went out for dinner and drinks with coworkers, 
and returned to her room at Mandalay, at 2 a.m., intoxicated. Surveillance footage shows 
Anderson shared an elevator with Alonzo Monroy Gonzalez, a Mandalay employee, when 
returning to her room. After Anderson entered her room and went to sleep, Gonzalez entered 
Anderson’s room without authorization and raped her.  
 
 Gonzalez worked as a House Person at Mandalay, and his late shift had little supervision. 
Mandalay provided Gonzalez with a keycard that opened the guest rooms on his assigned floors. 
Prior to hiring Gonzalez, Mandalay performed a criminal background check using the social 
security number Gonzalez provided, which indicated no criminal record. Mandalay solicited 
Gonzalez’s employment references and filled out I-9 documents, however, it is not clear whether 
Mandalay contacted those references or properly updated Gonzalez’s information in his I-9.   
 
Gonzalez’s prior disciplinary history shows Mandalay suspended him for 31 days 
because of his misuse of employee radios, and lies about such misuse. Additionally, Gonzalez 
allegedly harassed and threatened a female co-worker. At trial, Anderson presented evidence that 
Mandalay employees have a history of sexual assaults on Mandalay premises, along with a 
history of unauthorized entry into occupied rooms. An expert report indicated Mandalay had 
insufficient security when Gonzalez attacked Anderson, as well as ongoing security defects.  
 
The district court granted Mandalay’s motion for summary judgment on Anderson’s 
vicarious liability claim, concluding NRS § 41.745(1) and Wood v. Safeway, Inc., 2  barred 
vicarious liability against Mandalay because Gonzalez’s acts were truly independent, not 
committed in the course of the task assigned, and not reasonably foreseeable. The district court 
also denied as futile Anderson’s request for leave to amend to add a direct negligence claim.   
  
 
Discussion 
                                                     
1  By Emily Haws. 
2  121 Nev. 724, 121 P.3d 1026 (2005).  
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Mandalay was not entitled to summary judgment.  
 
 The Court reviews summary judgment de novo. 3  Summary judgment is improper 
whenever “a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party.”4 When reviewing 
the record, “the evidence and any reasonable inferences drawn from it, must be viewed in a light 
most favorable to the nonmoving party.”5  
 
NRS § 41.745(1)(c) sets forth a factual inquiry.  
 
An employer is vicariously liable for employees’ intentional torts when an employee’s 
act is “reasonably foreseeable under the facts and circumstances of the case considering the 
nature and scope of his or her employment.”6 These factual and circumstantial inquiries are 
issues of fact, not legal determinations. The Legislature clarified this reasonable foreseeability 
standard, relying on the definition of reasonable foreseeability that emerged from premises 
liability cases, stating, “[C]onduct of an employee is reasonably foreseeable if a person of 
ordinary intelligence and prudence could have reasonably anticipated the conduct and the 
probability of injury.”7  Simply put, the reasonable foreseeability standard requires a factual 
inquiry.  
 
A reasonable jury could conclude Gonzalez’s act was reasonably foreseeable.  
  
 This Court has considered reasonable foreseeability under NRS § 41.745(1)(c) in only 
one published case.8 In Wood, as a matter of law, an employer could not reasonably foresee an 
employee’s sexual assault of another worker in the building because the employee had no 
criminal history, the employer required higher proof of identification and immigration status, and 
the employer had received no sexual harassment complaints over the last ten years. 9 
Distinguishably, here, “the prior on-premises attacks, employees’ regular keycard abuse, 
Gonzalez’s disciplinary history, and Mandalay’s decision to provide Gonzalez keyed access to 
guest rooms with minimal supervision” allow a reasonable jury to conclude that Gonzalez’s 
sexual assault on a Mandalay guest was foreseeable.  
 
Whether other states would find that Gonzalez’s act to be outside the scope of his 
employment is irrelevant, because the proper inquiry is reasonable foreseeability. Further, other 
states have in fact concluded sexual assault can be reasonably foreseeable either through a 
vicarious liability inquiry or a direct negligence inquiry. Thus, under the facts and circumstances 
here, a reasonable jury could conclude Gonzalez’s act was reasonably foreseeable.  
 
The district court erred in concluding it would be futile for Anderson to amend her complaint.  
                                                     
3  Wood, 121 Nev. at 729, 121 P.3d at 1029.  
4  Sprague v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 109 Nev. 247, 249, 849 P.2d 320, 322 (1993).  
5  Wood, 121 Nev. at 729, 121 P.3d at 1029.  
6  NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.745(1)(c) (2014).  
7  Id.  
8  Wood, 121 Nev. 724, 121 P.3d 1026. 
9  Id at 729, 1029.  
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 While a court’s decision on a motion for leave to amend is generally reviewed for abuse 
of discretion, futility is a question of law reviewed de novo.10 Anderson’s proposed amendments 
are not futile because a reasonable jury could conclude Gonzalez’s attack was reasonably 
foreseeable. An unlawful act will not supersede causation if the act was foreseeable.11  Further, 
the district court’s reliance on NRS § 651.015 was erroneous because the statute only applies to 
injury caused by a “person who is not an employee under the control or supervision of the owner,” 
and Gonzalez was a Mandalay employee.12  
  
Conclusion 
 
  NRS 41.745(1)(c) sets forth a factual inquiry, and a reasonable jury could conclude 
Mandalay could reasonably foresee Gonzalez’s sexual assault of Anderson because of his 
disciplinary history, unfettered keycard access with minimal supervision, and Mandalay’s notice 
of its employees’ history of sexual assault and unauthorized entry. Anderson’s proposed 
amendment to add a direct negligence claim was not futile because Gonzalez’s unlawful act was 
foreseeable, and thus does not supersede causation. The Court reversed the district court’s grant 
of summary judgment and denial of Anderson’s motion for leave to amend, and remanded the 
matter to the district court for further proceedings.  
 
                                                     
10  See Whealon v. Sterling, 121 Nev. 662, 665, 119 P.3d 1241, 1244 (2005); see Buzz Stew, LLC v. City of N. Las 
Vegas, 124 Nev. 224, 227-28, 181 P.3d 670, 672 (2008); see also Sanford v. MemberWorks, Inc., 625 F.3d 550, 557 
(9th Cir. 2010).  
11  “While unlawful conduct can interrupt and supersede the causation between a negligent act and injury, an 
unlawful act will not supersede causation if it was foreseeable.” 
12  NEV. REV. STAT. § 651.015 (2014). 
